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Forward Exchange Rates in
Efficient Markets: The Effects of
News and Changes in Monetary
Policy Regimes
Mack Ottand Paul L W. M. Veugelers
)L,ZIP ENCE the late l970s, theoretical explanations of
exchange rate deternunation have emphasized the
asset approach rather tItan the expenditure ap-
proach.’ Most of the empirical research applying the
asset models of exchange rate detern malion also sub-
sume the efficient market hypothesis. In this article,
we test three efficient niarke I hypotheses bearing on
forward exchange rates: Flrst, are forward rates unbi-
ased forecasts of future spot exchange rates? Second,
does ‘‘news’’ in particular iinanti cipated changes in
nominal or real interest differentials — explain for—
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‘One rationale tor this shin is the observation that the interest rate
parity (IRP) postulate of the asset view has held up substantially
better than the purchasing power parity (PPP) postulate or the
expenditure view; see Mussa (1979) and Frenkel (1981b). The
former reters to the equality ot asset yields across currencies, while
the latter refers to the equality ot purchasing power across curren-
cies. PPP frequently, and forprotracted periods, has been violated
by exchange rates; see Frenkel (1981 b). Thus, analysts have been
faced with either modifying the PPP assumption and diluting its
relevance, or accepting the evidence and developing theories to
explain it, Indeed, some authors, Bomhoff and Korteweg (1983) and
Darby (1981), argue that changing real exchange rates vitiate the
relevance of PPP.
ward rate forecast errors? ~tiiird, are forward rate fore-
cast errors affected by change in the U.S. monetary
policy regime? These hypotheses are tested by exam-
ining the forecast errors the difference between the
forward rate arid the subsequently observed spot rate)
for the U.S. dollar forward rate against the currencies
of eight industrialized countries over the latest float-
ing-rate era (1973—85).
~‘ •~r’~
The forward exchange rate in an efficient market
reflects all the information possessed by individuals
active in that market. i’hus, iti an open market, the
forward rate should he. an unbiased predictor’ of the
future spot rate Hence,are.gression of the observed
spot rate at time t on the forward rate at time t — I
where exchange rates are measured by natural loga-
rithms of the dollar pr ces of foreign exchangei,
lii 5, = ~ b t~_,+ t~,
should result in an estimated constant not signiti—
cantlv different from zero, an estimated coeflicient on
2See Dornbusch (1976), Mussa (1979), Frenkel (1981a), Bomhoff
and Korteweg (1983) and Edwards (1983b).FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS JUNEIJULY 1988 ~
the forward rate not significantly dilli rent from 1 .0,
and serially uncorrelated errors Ie,l.’
The empirical finding of a significant iriter’cept has
been sufficiently frequent mi recent research that it is
no longer interpreted as a departure froni market
efficiency. The question, then, is, what does the signifi-
cant intercept represent?
The current view is that the intercept represents a
return to speculation.’ For example, if real interest
rates on Ii .S. securities are higher than those on for-
eign securities, investors will shift their’ portfolios to-
ward the higher—yielding securities denominated in
U.S. cun’rencv; if these investors are risk—averse to Lrni—
foreseen changes in currency values, they can hedge
by selling the higher—yielding U.S. currenc forwan’d
arid buying their’ own currency forward. By IHP, the
resulting upward pressure on the fonwan-d nate must
just offset the higher yield obtained on the U.S. securr—
ties? Thus, the forward rate in equation I . in such
cases, would overestimate the luture spot r’ate so that
the estimated intercept would be negative. Con —
verselv. a higher’ r’ate our non—IJ.S . securities, by the
same logic, would imply a positive intercept.
Frenkel 11981 a I argues that changes in expeetations
between the time that the lorwar’d rate pr’ediction is
made and the spot nate is observed explain ttie for’—
ward error’s. ‘l’hese changes in expectations, tvhiich he
calls news,are based on informat ion revealed after the
forward contracts are made 1w t before the spot rates
are realized. ‘l’hus, unanticipated changes iii interest
r’ate differentials between time t — I and t, — one
example of news — explain part of the residual be-
tween the forward rate forecast U, and the realized
spot rate s,. Incorporating this modification into equa-
tion I yields
121 s, = a + hi,_, + clii — i’i, —— E,_,Ii — i’i,l + e.
where ii san interest rate of the same term as the
forwar’d rate with asterisks indica tinig non— LI .S. vari-
ables interest rates are riot in logsi . Once again, risk—
neutrality arid efficient markets would imply an insig—
riificant intercept and a slope coefficient of unity; the
sign of the coefficient oii the news variable, however,
would depend upon whether the rise in the interest
differential were due to a relative rise in tl.S. inflation
— in which case it would be positive — on a relative
rise in U.S. real interest rates — in which case it would
be negative.”
t”r’enkels proxy for’ the expected interest rate difler—
ential was obtained fr’om a regression of the interest
differential on its own lagged values and the lagged
forward exchange rate. Estimating t Ii is model over
1973—79 for’ the pound sterling, deutschemark and
franc, he found the intercept to he insignifican it and
the coefficient of the lagged forward rate not signifi—
cantlv different from one; these findings are consistent
with the eflicient market hvpotl resis . Moreover, the
coefficients on the news variable — the unantici ate I
interest rate change — were positive, which he inter’—
preted as pn’iriiarrly reflecting the r’elativelv high and
rising [IS, expected inflation rate during this period.
..YdUJ F~X{JH :\‘i
An mlportarit insight of the asset—market approach
to exchange rate detenminiation is the emphasis on
expectations. Asset prices ar’e much more dependent
6An increase in the expected inflation ratedifferential implies that, in
the future, the dollar price of foreign currency will rise faster, and
fewer dollars will be demanded because of their higher holding cost:
hence, s, would rise. An increase in the U.S. real interest rate
relative to foreign rates would increase the value of the dollar:
hence, s, would fall.
~These propositions about the forward exchange rate have not been
supported by recent empirical work. For example, Hansen and
Hodrick (1980) find significant evidence ofrisk premia and explana-
tory power in lagged errors in both the 1 920s and 1 970s in one- and
three-month forward markets. Baillie, Lippens and McMahon
(1983), using a time series model on weeklydata reject thehypothe-
sis that the forward rate is an unbiased predictor of the future spot
rate in weekly data. Fama (1984) argues that the risk premium
explains much ot the error in the forward rate’s forecasts and tinds
that the risk premium and expected future spot rate are negatively
correlated.Jacobs (1982) argued that the forward rate is an imper-
fect proxy for the expected rate and constructs a time series proxy
for the expected rate. Unlike Fama, however,Jacobs foundinforma-
tion in the past variables, that is, intormation not included in the
efficiently constructed forward rate attime t — 1. Jacobs’ emphasis
on omitted information is analogous to the decomposition sug-
gested by Frenkel (1981a) and elaborated in Isard (1983) and
Edwards (1983a, 1983b). Edwards (1983b) finds that market effi-
ciency is not rejected in three out oftourcurrencies in his study once
news is included,
‘Fama (1984) and Hodrick and Srivastava (1985). Hodrick and
Hansen (1983) find that significant premia are both common and
time varying. Frenkel (1981a) finds that news explains some of the
risk premium while Edwards (1983b) tinds that the combination of
news and a system estimation technique eliminates the significant
intercept.
5lnvestors are concerned about after-tax real rates of return; through-
out this article we ignore the possibility that long-run real interest
differentials may persist due to different tax rates on interest and
investment income. Since our tests are on the effects of unantici-
pated changes in interest differentials, this possibility does not affect
Our results.-.1 - — -
than cur-r-enit goods pr-ices on the anticipated connr’se of
future events. Conisequen tlv, the role of news is most
aptly captured in the change of expectations, not the
er-n-or between the expected and n-ealized yield diflèr—
entials,
By an application of tIlt’ and the eflicien I for-ward
market hypothesis forforeign exchianige.we can obtain
an al ten-native form of the news equation) 2 estimatect
by F’nenket. ‘the alternative model takes the form Isee
shaded insert on the next paget:
IT S — t~,= cv -I’ ~ + oi,.
‘h’liis model has the advanitage of using a man-ket—
implied interest differential as well as directly em—
bodying the change in expec tationis rather than the
empirically derived, expectation error pn-oxy used by
Fn’enkel.
a.hsflnntinn lit wren j.:w.n anti
IVnrntn,al /Vei+’:+:
F’renkel claimed that the positive coefficient on the
initenest rate nie~~’s he found during 1973—79 reflected
the relatively high arid rising U.S. inflation n-ateduring
this per-iod. Since the U.S. inflation natehas fallen both
absolnrtel~’and r-ehative to other- na tic) nis in the year-s
since 1979, the estimated coefficient on the expected
niomnnial interest difierenitirtl should be unstable over
the full period 1973—85. One way to deal with this
problem is to break the period into smaller units, eat hi
of which have uniform r-elative U.S. inflation rates. We,
instead, separ-ate the real arid inflation coniponeni ts of
the nominal news variable. ‘t’hat is, we ~vilI view the
change in the nominal interest differ-ential as the sum
(if a change in tlre expected r-eal ~‘ieId cliffer-ential arid
the change in) the expected in flation differ-ential . ‘1‘hese
components of the niews should have differ’ent effects
on the forward n-ate error-s.
A rise in the real vnehd ori irivestments in one (:o un—
try relative to those elsewh (nre, in the absent e of carii—
tal n’estr-ictions, tyihl cause an immediate appn’eciation
in its exchange nate arid resnnlt in a negative error’ in
equation 3. Such appreciations are transitory because
capital inflows will bring down the initially higher
yields, while the concomitant outflows raise nbcyields
else~vh ere, until equality of yields is r’estoned. Conise—
cluently, thevet’ rise in the r-elative yield that cannses a
‘See Dornbusch (1976). Isard (1983), and Edwards (1983a). None-
theless. the existence of risk premia impliesthat interest differences
have persisted for some time in open capital markets: see Fama
(1984). Hodrick and Hansen (1983) find these risk premia to be
nonconstant and that their time variation is nof summarized by
nominal interest rate movements.
currency to appreciate also cr-eates theaniticipation of
its subseqtrent depr-eciatiori as yield difi’enences go to
zero.
In contrast, an men-ease in) the expected inflation r
differential pr-nmar-ilv alters the rate of depr-eciation of
the exchange rate by chatiging its PPP level arise in
the inflation differ’ential causes the exchange rate to
rise faster over’ time by the amount of the inflation
increase. The depreciation of the spot rate also will
reflect the perceived increase in the holding costs of
the country’s currency which r-educes the quanl its’
clenintnidecl.
Thus, express the nominal tiews as [lie sum of its
real and initIation components,
141 Al’j,, = ~lr’, -— r~’l+ Alir — 1r’J
wher-e n- = expected -cal interest rate, and
it, = expected inflation rate.
‘theni, scrhsti tntte the r-igli t—hand—side ofequation 4 in to
equation 3, to obtain
In equation 5, a is noni—zet’o in the presence of a risk
prem iurn. [3, is negative Isirice an unan ticipated rela-
tive r-ise in tJ,5, n-eal rates lowers s,, irnplyirrg s, — l’,, —C
01, [3. is positive but smaller than [3, sincear-isc in the
relative LI.S. inflation rate will cause a change in the
n-are of clepr-eciation of the dollar, and, through (le-
er-eased demanrds for’ tar isaction balance’s, sonic de—
clinic in) its levehi, and s, is a serially uncorr-elated
dist ur-hance term.
attire lilAc! til’iVtr ,.+~ •l. ii:ittiSrJt’ iii
C- — /
Ilie estimated par-arneter’s of an economic -elation
reflect the per-cowed policy stance of the govem’nniient
and monietan’ author’ities. ‘I‘Iius, as l,ucas 119741 an’—
gnned, cbaniges in policy. either hi toad goals sucli as the
desim~edin flittion rate or nan’m‘O%ver oties sucli as the
method in which the policy is impleniiented. ninav alien’
the pnrbhic’s m’esponse to prices and otlien’information.’
‘We abstract from changes in the long-run real exchange rate in this
analysis. That is, different rates of capital or human capital invest-
ment will cause different rates of productivity growth, or resource
price changes that can alter the real exchange rate; see Darby
(1980), Bomhoft and Korteweg (1983). Also, a reduction in the
security of property rights canmake investment in one currency less
attractive than investments in other currencies, depreciating the
currency and raising its real yields; see Dooley and Isard (1980). An
apt application of the Dooley-Isard hypothesis may be the change in
the French government in 1981, which was followed by significant
nationalizations ~- especially in the banking sector. In our analysis.
the only structural change considered is the U.S. monetary policy
regime.FEDERAL RESERVE BANKOF ST. LOUIS JUNEAJULY 1986 ~Z
Forward Exchange Rate Errors, Efficient Markets and
the News: the Role of the Forward Premium
In its strong form, the efficientmarket hypothesis 12,71 e — ~ it In — i I, , h’ ,, tn — i I, ,
inlihihies that the intencept in equation I will h ten’o
tRP nniplnesthat the annualnzed one—nionth forwan dl arid the eoefffi tent of the lagged fonwan’d rat wnll be
- premium
unity C onsequenfly, tileennot term, e, nssimply the
etm’ot ofthe lonwan d mate’s fbiecast ofthe spot n ate I’ 3) tp, 121f, — si,
21! s, — f, , — e,, ts equal to the interest differential expected to pre
- vail dnming t thinough t1 ,
I nenkeh s tnsnght concerning thie role of news is to
angue that this em oris due to nnfom niatnon revealed I’ 4’ Ip, = t in n’,,,.
after t I (but befone ti which alter-s e pectations where the turn to maturity of the nntcn’est n’ates is
and, hence, s, -- -
equal to thehiolding period in Ip. Itthis equality did
-. nunrent e (hange r-ates ali’ead~reflect current not hold, riskh ss opportunities for profntahilc in hi
cxpect~trainsabout the future while nhanges in nhr. trage x%ouldl exist t’hus, suhstituting the neletant
wr rente~hange natn netleet prnniannty changes in
dir-se expe I dons tthnch by do inirtnon, amise fm on) lonwan-d premta from d quatron 2.4 for th expe~ted
new in ton-m Uwn ‘ nnten-est differentials in equation 2, and then sub
- stntuting this e pmession for [lie e -ron-ten m nn equa
1nenkel s specification equation), employs th dnl-
-- tton 1, we obtain ftnence between the realized interest differential
and the evpet ted drifenential, howeter hns aigu- 12,51 , — f, , ~ 1~tp I
merit implies that the news taniabhc should be thie -
-- - - wInch (an be written in an estimable form as
change in the expected dtffenentnal between t 1
andt Ihatis, 31 s, f a [3Mp, ‘ to.
Frenkel (1981b) pp. 700—701 emphasis added Frenkel notes
(see footnote 31, p 701) that Gustav Cassel, the mo recog Thns rs known as the covered arbntrage condmtron For example, rt
nnzed proponent of the purchasnng power parnty doctrnne also thefp (n — n ), an mnvestor could sell pounds and buydollar
recognized thns forward-looking aspect- at trme t~ use the proceeds to buy a U S. securrty; by buynng
forward pounds at t, the mnvestor removes anyexchange rate rrsk
The nnternatnonal valuation ofthecurrency wrIl, then gener- and obtarns a hngher ynetd than he would have in U K. securrtnes.
ally show a tendencyto antncnpate events so to speak. and Smnce thms ynetd differentnal 5 rrskless. arbitrage should drnve nt to
become more an expressnon of the rnternal value that the zero and in the process, ensurethe equality shown mn equation
currency is expected to possess in a few months or per 24 For a fuller drscussron and many instructiveexamples se
haps rn a years time (Cassel 1930 pp. 149—50) Wood and Wood (1985) pp 378ff
T i sclone regression (‘5 in), tes of quatio is 23 (in’ .~ sud Ii a ri onet ~ b oh it’s a gi nil ‘ Ilit Iish ‘r’ his potlie is
1 yh esensitive o cianigcs in po icy “oals an Ir e holds so that n-cal init( m’( ‘t rat( S an ‘0 Simph hhe chifl em
gi nes. once hetu eon nominal inter tr at s <nod an tr( pated
- mill ntioni , consn ~h°tntIs equation 4 btolchs stbile eqnra
n am-ttctnlan the lit pothe c s ton’ n t nl and nntlalron - ‘ - trot) 5 follons a an nnnplm atnon ol equation Sand I i ‘st s mm nian-r/cd a!rose ,t m’~d( pender fi on tIi rnone
tars po hi ~ n-eginrc . or ( \ctm bili st hn’mi Uie nilon t_ rs hr on [ma t ° isid r a 0 on ‘ian-s pol 5 me” ion of
ann Ihon ‘ts tar-un ts mn mid’ ‘ n’s gmoss tIi. - nil(me t mat ‘5 ‘sill
U’ ito ‘n-mimi ‘d hi~the pn’is at - and pmmbhiu cheni a! Ion
I ‘t if ( t i( Is umi font so ni t‘liar ges in) t Iiat cIt r rarid1 However a cntical aveatin cv luatmng equatnon 5 for5’. see b low)
‘ - s ama s assertion that, when compl te PPP does not hold uncer
ss ml c~ 0 ‘ n- arige nn m en t si n, Ic, . h it( r t’st n’ I( nlso tamnty and drffer ntnal tt e combine to trip the Fisher equation of
ssill - ‘t ((I pm’-~ t - expet tn k ri ab u ‘nftat’ ii hni its meaning (1984 p 323)targeting item-est rates.” tJndem- such a policy stance,
nnovenienits in inten-est n’ates are, to some extenit, policy
determined ii) the shoi-t i-un since changes in) the
niomitial inter-est nate induce offsettingchianges in the
money supply thm’ough a pohic —m-eaction feedback.
Consequently, changes inn inten’est r’ates uniclem- a
regime of tan-geting in)ten-est rates convey differ-cr nt in—
forniationi than do innterest mate changes under a n-c—
gime of tar-getimig monetary aggregates. A n’eal interest
diflerential under’ interest—n-ate tai’geting cannot be
closed by capital flows alone ifthe nnonetam’v airthor-its’
chooses to maintain a pan icular- nonninal tan-get i-ate
which niaintainis the differential. Oven- time, ani inter’est
rate tam-get below the mam-ket n-ate will incn’ease the
initiation differ’enitial . ‘tine adjustment pm-ocess ttieni
depends totally upon the relative initIation n-ates to
n’eston’e PPP.And, again, the n’isk premium embodied in)
the intercept should be smaller during an interest—rate
r’eginne due to the n-educed shion-t—r’un, intet-esi—r’ate
oncen’tainity.
This policy regiurehypothesis can be tested U an F’—
test (in) the m-estriclionimplicit in hiotbi eqtnation 3 and 5
that the coefficients — a, ~ ft, 1~-— an’e stahite oven-
chaniges in) nionetam-v policy regimes. ‘the r-estn-iction is
tested by at ding i titem’cept and slope dum ms’ s’an-iatihes
toget equations 3’ and 5’, computing tfne F—statistic oni
the change in the residuals between the estimates of
the r-estricted and on restricted ed(uationns:
I3’Is,- f’~.,
i5’Is,l,a,+a,,tJ+~,~Ir’,—m’~ii~,,DiXIr,—m’7i
±~Aitr, - ‘ir~I+ ft~IJ~iir, —i-nfl ±r’,
where h) =
iiOctober 1979 cic September- 1982
otlier-ivise.
‘h’he implications ofthe analysis in) equations 3’ amid
5’ are worth summarizing hefon’e n’epom-ting theestima—
tion results - I-irst, mews about the meal inter-est cli ffbr’—
Inonly two U.S. monetary policy regimes are distinguished in this
study — the October 1979—September 1982 period and the remain-
ing period before and after. Implicitly, this assumes that both the
pre-October-l 979 and the post-September-I982 periods are based
on interest-rate targeting procedures; support for this characteriza-
tion of these two periods is offered in Gilbert (1985), Kaufman (1982)
and Hasche (1985), The foreign monetary policy stance might also
be argued to be relevant; while this is a possibility for a refinement
on the estimates reported in this study, there do not appear to have
been substantial changes during the period 1974—83 in six of the
eight countries. The policy procedures of six of the eight non-U.S.
countries(excluding Italy and Netherlands) are reviewed in Johnson
(1983).
ential causes negative fon-ecast error’s s, — f,,. while
changes in the inflation differential cause positive
forecast en-n-on’s, If there an’e periods dominated by
n’elative volatility in inflation and other periods domi—
niated by real yield volatility, then equation 3, whnicfn
restnicts the coefficients to equality, should be n’e—
jected by an F—test in) compan’ison with equation) 5
whicfn does not restrict these coefficients to equality,
Second, the theony undem-lyinig equation 5 implies
that news ahiout the expected inflation differ’ential wilt
cause forecast errors, s, — f..,, whose magnitude de-
pends on the sensitivity ofmoney dennamid to changes
in the inflation n-ate, The coefficient should have the
same sigti as the change in the inflation differential,
Given the shor’tness of the observation per’iod — one
month — the regnession coefficient ft in equation 5
should be positive but may not be significant.
Thim-d, since the interest rates thence, fomwar-d pr-c—
mia) an’e assumed to lie deten’minecl without a mone-
tary policy r’eaction function in the analysis repm-e—
sented in eqanationi 5, monetan’v policy based on
intem-est—n-ate tan’gets affects these hypotheses. If the
monetary policy r-egirrie affects thie nuarket vah.nations,
ic,, spot and forwam’cl exchange m-ates, hence forwam-d—
rate fom-ecast en-r-oi-s, then ihm n-estm-ictions in) equation 5
which an-c r-ennoved iii equation 5’ will be n-ejected by
an F—test on the impm’ovecl fit of equation 5’ r-ehatis’e to
equation) 5.
F’our-th, si rice it is well known that the van’ianices of
US, initem-est rates, tioth nominah and real, have hieen
higher- clum-inig monetary tan-gel n-egimes than alten’nia—
tise regimes, them-c is a gn-eater likelihood of misfor’e—
castirng inter’est rates unden’ a monietarv tar’get re—
gime.-‘ The nisk pr’enniumn measun-ed by the mt er’cept
which pm’innan-ihy is deter-mined by tins risk, should he
negative~lam-ger and mon-e significant clum’ing pen’iods of
nnonietany tam-geting than dinning periods of interest—
n-ate targeting, -lhis hypothesis can be tested by the
sigriificance of the mtercept’s clunims’ variable iii
equatiOnis 3’ on- 5’.
Finally, tinden’ the efficient nnarket hypothesis em—
bodied in) equations 3, 5, 3’ arid 5’, thur err-on’ terms
shioulch be serially uncom-related - Cor’n’elation in) tIie
clistun-bance tem’m implies incomplete use ofpast infom’-
mali (in and failure to exhaust pnoti 1 0 ppor-tunities -
Altem-matively, if mam-kets an-c efficient, ser’iahiy com’r-e—
lated n’esiduahs imply a misspecificationi of tIne estimat—
ing equation) -
“See foley (1983) and Rasche (1985).FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF St LOUIS JUNEJJULY 1985 ~
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The models specified it) equations I , 3.5,3’ and 5’
were estimated using monthl data fm-mn Cctohen’ 1 973
through June 1985. using the US. dollar spot and one—
month—for-wand paces of tIre cinnm’encies of Canada,
France, Gem-many, h tal~’, Japan, the Nethem’hands, Swi tz—
eniand arid the inited Kingdom. The tests are mrsted
in that equation 3i sobtained ln’oni edfuation) I by
iniposil ion) of the efticiermt market hs’pothesis. I-qua—
tion 1 also contains both the n-estrictnoni to suppress
the n-eat inter-est rate s’s. inflation rate checomposi lion)
and the n’estm’ictioni to suppress the effects of changing
monetary policy regimes on the regn-ession coef—
Iincr)ts’ s’aloes. We hr-st 1es t the simple efficient man’ket
hypothesis in’ estimnating equation 1 - Next, we est i—
mate the simple news model svith the chiange in) the
nominal fonvancl preniium, equation) 3, This modeh
contains ho th the rmonninal miess’s arid the policy m’egime
n-estn-nctions above - We can then test these m-estnctions
Us’estimating 5’, which is unrestricted and compan-ing
it through F-tests with equations 5 and 3’, F-tests on
equation 5’ vs - equation 5 antI 5’ s’s- 3’ delem’minc
respectively, whether the policy regime or nominal
forward premium n-estniclions can be r’ejected.
Thsespot and 31J—das’ l’or’wardexchange n-ales used in)
the estimates are Ness’ York opening market ilL) am,
ri)idpoints for the last business day of the mont h as
compiled by the hlank of America, ‘l’he change in the
n-cal inter-est differential was obtained fn’om tine change
in the forward pm-emninrm: b-’inst, the forM’ard pn-emniuni
was conven-ted to an annualized rate; the change in
this annualized fonward pn-emiurn is the news — that
is, the change in the expectedl nor—mat initenest differ-—
ential, Second, an expected annualized imnflation n-ate
for- the one-month hon-izon was compinted for each
countmy from its monthly Cl’l series,” ‘the change irs
the diffen-ential, ftS. minus fon-eigni inflation, is the
change in the inflation differential used in estinnatimng
equations S anch 5’. The change in the m-eal inten-est
difl’en-ential is then thechange in thieannualized, nom-
inal, one—momnth—fonward pn-emiumn minus the change
in the expected imnflation differential,
2ctemens Kool of Erasmus University computed this series using a
multi-state Kalman filter, A simple Kalman filter is a forecasting
method based on assumptions about the forecasted variable’s
relation to current and lagged data on itself and or other series, A
multi-state Kalman filter allows this relation to vary according to a
feedback or adaptive error loop; the multi-state modifier refers tothe
alternative sets of assumed weights. A noncise description and
illustrative example are contained in the statistical appendix to
Bomhoff and Korteweg (1983),
‘table I r-epom-ts the n-esults of estimating equation) 1
during the full sample period, October 1973 through
June 1985, For- six of the eight cun-n-encies considered!,
manketefficiency is not n-ejected;for-Japan and Switz-
erland, however’, the mai-ket efficiency hypothesis is
n-ejected at the 5 pen-cent level, Fon’ all eight, the Our-
bin—Watson statistic indicates that hypothesis of sen-i-
ally uncorrelated distun’bances is not n-ejected. Thtns,
except fom’Japanand Switzerland, the resuhts in table 1
indicate that the news model specified in eqtnationn 3 is
an appnopmiate empirical model,
For Japan and Switzerland, equation I was n-eesti—
mated by snrbperiods before, dud rigand since the t IS.
monietarv aggregate target regime of October’ 1979
thn’ough Sep tenibem’ 1982- For’ each coirntry, the by—
pothesis of serially oncorm-ehated n-esiduals was not
n-ejected in any suhpen-iod - For- each of the snmtiperiocls,
the efficient muan’ket hypotheses bearing on the coef-
ficients fon’ Switzerland were not m’ejecI ed . For’ Japan,
the can-her two sobipem-ioct estimates do not n-eject mar-—
ket efficiency, but thur n-ecenI suhper-iod n-ejects niar-ket
efficiency both in) ternis of a significant inten’cept and
he deviation fr-tim tinily of thin) lagged forwam’d ia he
coeificient,L
Consequently, fon- neilher Switzen-lancl nor Japan is
the estimation of equation) 3 justified since equation) 3
is der-ived from equation) 1 assumning a unit coefficient
on f., Yet, equation 3’ orequation 5’ may lit) justifinmnl
for- Switzerland since the dummy variables cani ac—
coon)t fom’ the nonstahle coehhrcient. For Japan, t hit)
failum-e of tine ellicien t nnan-ke h hiypothesis in the lash
subper’iocl is not offset byany ofour s’an’iables, and it is
cnmsistent with this failure that Japan rejects each of
the specifications equations 3’,Sancl 5’ as n-epom-tecl in
tables 2 and 3.
‘iabte 2 reports the n’esnnlts of estimating equation) 3,
the nesys model with the change in the nomininal for’—
svard premiunu, os’en- the full period, October 1973—
June 1985, In sharp conti-ast to the n-esmnhts in) table I,
wInch) suppom-t this specifications, thur estimates uni—
fommis’ n-eject this model: no coefficient is significant at
“The October 1982—June 1985 estimates for Japan are very curious.
The estimated intercept is huge in comparison with the earlier-
period Japanese estimates, the Swiss estimates or any of the
estimates in table 11
a = —l,192(s,e. = 0,548), ft = 0.783(s.e. = 0.100).ssof Forward xchangeMarke EffIc encyfor U.S. Do lar
ber 973—June 985 (U S Monetary Regimes No
s inguished)
S many
CoeffIce s atnstes Tes
urrency rcept , —
anada 0002 09 8 0981 2.16 03 0
0002) (0012)
Fr nce 0 002 1 00 0.985 2.07 05 7
(0018) 00 0)
Germany 0.020 0 981 0 954 203 1,800
(0016) (0018
Italy 0.012 1 002 0992 1 87 500
(00 2) (0007)
Japan —0.298 0946 0.940 1 80 7 4
(0,112) (0,020)
Neth rlands —0013 0991 07 2.01 148
(0017) (00 8)
S itzerand 0.034 0.96 09 2 192 35 7
(001 ) (0015)
Unmted Kingdom 0.001 0994 07 4 I 82 0,483
0009) (0,014)
‘S nd rd error of es mated oefficrents ppear in parenthes 8: asterisks mndncate rejection at 5
percen level o mdi idual efficient ma ket hypothese intercept is zero slope coefficient — 1 0.
st of ho’ t e icren ma’ket hypothesis tha inte cept is zero and slope coefficient is unr y a terisk
dicates r fec non at 5 percent level
- nymt~non tl t ton Irtheni —h —‘ ruh Ic m hj -net --
‘it’ t i sXt) the ‘igrtc n-mtnm es rsttd, on sir,—
‘i) vsit r )e t ffrt nt-nit miian-kt t o hs i S host m S C . tlii
-‘ ttitsi tfstriahynnnn’orn’tl,ttc tistnm -m t’ ism ot , sd’st is e thost,tte ,S itint nm )‘\ ‘‘i
j-t td \ mr i-I’s’ i e n’tt’i no’’ mgc au ~t ettdt mo’d’t -n ,ti nsl’ 1 tss -m
tom tf-lttin he xi-n’n t s tr ode’ mi- ) r \t 1-nig ‘L aul S-ti-’giiiten-s l’fr
oi alun’t’, r ~- s, h n . ie - itisti - nI n 0 my i )r ttI - i ti) -
- n’ ‘-tsr’ In 0 it) hist’n’uisi
- I o -- oh’t ~nnic - t t on
nc di’’\-’egni fnt am) - inn ) Cit
-- - - ‘ n -t ‘sol’nt t’) nit mi ’dn gg’-
/) -t )ored m ‘nile - S--s nm tctt ‘sn-’ - -
-. - ‘nc -nm’’tmn’ nCr r- ~‘ S un—nil ‘ 93 ‘h-r t tnsnm) - in, ti t inal tr— -- -
--- - . snhiso - id itmmctd nit
ire n i ito ) is- it is n t-t- t I
iI’hlnlio -tms{ is’ n i~ll ~n m t I nr -I’m s h o’ ii I’ —
tLn in’’stiI~’chi- ) - H mi it’ ‘ sO’ e’fe to iciet n-’in’ai’ e
,‘i’tts Sn ‘ tnt’tn\’it, -, n’n~ ,l ‘ni’ - n”rt’ un it” ‘i t~’ntt ‘
tl’:it’ sRi 0 nitsc nnti s’ sprt-t’it ni
i,.ii- .~3 ) d’ mrt t’ais’L,, s-m ii lit I sr— -it’ ii ‘it
-- m -s t,-’- s sn-n -- - -- n’s- - STable2
Tests of News Model Using Change in Nominal Annualized
Forward Premium on U.S. Dollar, October 1973—June 1985
(U.S. Monetary Regimes Not Distinguished)
Coefficients SummaryStatistics Test
Currency Intercept Sfp DW F F
Canada 0001 0069 - 0,004 216 0,455 2,059
(0,001) (0102)
France 0,003 0076 0,002 2 04 1,347 2937
(0,003) (0,066)
Germany 0,004 - 0,146 0,003 2,06 0600 1,898
(0 003) (0 188)
Italy —0002 0016 0005 1 86 0332 0,053
(0 002) (0,027)
Japan —0002 0017 0006 180 0,236 1254
(0 003) (0 035)
Netherlands 0,005 0.031 0 000 2.03 1 004 4 164
(0-003) (0,031)
Switzerland --0004 0011 0,007 1 92 0,004 0,326
(0003) (0,179)
United Kingdom 0 002 0006 0 007 1 83 0,002 1.888
(0.003) (0 123)
Standard errors of estimated coefficients appear in parenthese -
F-statistic fortesting the equality rest ictron on the coetficients of the change in the real and the inflation
differentials (component ofthe change in the nominal forward premium), asterisk nndicates rejection at
5 percent level
t:ohummi, F—testi lint, in contrast tti tatihe 2, tbie Neth’ner-—
lands dhoes not when the ti_S - oionetaiv r’eginre si nift is
accoun)ted for, Considering the appm-tipr-iate spet:ifica—
tion, equatitinss 3 tir S -, six of the eight equat ionis am-e
sigmiifican I in) terms tif their tis’en’ahh fit IF—staiisi icsi at
the 5 pci-cenil level, Fiance is significant at thtr Ci pen’—
ceniI level, annd seven of eigiit cciuntm’ies r-trjet:t thtr
n-estr-nction of stable t:tiefhciem)ts across nitimietam-v i-c—
gimne t:hianiges at the 10 lien-cent Ievtrl oi’ tiet ten’. Only
Japan fails the F—test for- the significance of the mimtideh.
mi ter’ms of the individual coefficients, six tnf the
eight countries evidence a significant negative n’isk
pm’emium 10 pen-cent tim’ better-i dhur’nng thtr tJ.S. mnone—
tars’ aggregate largetiog ptnr-iotI, while the intei’cept is
uniformly nonsignificant dialing the othen’ t LS, niont,—
tam’s’ policy m’trgimtr, October’ t973—Septennben’ 1979 anti
Ocitnbtri’ 1932—_lone 1985. ‘l’he innipact of the thffen-ent
i’egimes is also nititahile in the slope inittnr’action)
dumnnv, Tine coefficient tin the t:hange inn the n-eat
fon’wam-d pnennmmnn is tiegative and significant for Can—
adha, Gem-mans’, the Nether-lands, Switzen-land amid thie
United Kingdom. t’or Germans’, Switzerland anti the
Uniited Kingdom, this entails a switch frtinn a ptisitive
anti significant coefficient dur-ing the US. non—mone-
tat’s’ tan-geting n-egime-
‘Finns, for’ eat:h of the ses’emi cui’m-encies for’ vs’hicl) tine
niarktrt efficienicy cm-iten-ia an’e met, tIne U.S. nnont,tan-v
policy m-egin)e has a signilicant efftrct tin the en-r’om’s in)
the fon-ss’ar-d mate hon-erasts , Nttnr’e 5ptrr ihealIs’, two gen —
en-alizatiomns can lie ads’anced baset I on the resti Its in
tat mle 3, First, tine greaten- intei-est n-ate so kit ii its’ dum’ir g
[IS - mtinet an aggregate tan’gtrIii ig shtiws LII) in a sig—
nihcamit risk pm’emitnm tending tt stm-engthen the tltnllar
against six of the eight drum-r’encies - St-,ctinid, given the
failune to r-ej crct the nominal ftim’wan-d pn-emitnm n-estmic—
tion of equation 3’, the negatis’e significance of the
sltipe dummy implies that the interest ditTei-en tial
news was pr-imam’ily interpreted as an increase in the
inflation tiiffenenilial dun-irng US. non—monetary aggre-
gatetangeting pen-iotls and as an increase in neat inter-
est diffen-entials dhum-ing LI,S, monetary aggregate tan-get—
ing. in otbier-won-dhs, tlie dollar-appreciated ahong withi
n.nnanticipated mci-eases in the fon-war-dI pm-ernium dun—
ing Octtihem’ i979 tn Septennber 1982, tinnt depn’ecnatedlTable 3
Tests of News Model Using Unrestricted Specification, Octo
(U.S. Monetary Regimes Distinguished)
ber 1973—June 1985
Coefficients’ Summary Statistics Tests
Currency Intercept Dli ~K— r’) Dr S(n — n’) On’ H’ OW F F’ F4_-
Canada ‘-0,002 0.000 0.299 --0.436 —0,343 --0,776 0,056 2,19 2728 3,658’ 4,027’
(0,001) (0.003) (0.188) (0.223)4- (0,209)4- (0,253)’
France 0,001 —0.015 --0.023 —0,077 --0.368 0,211 0,045 2,12 2,297’ 2,352-f 2.133
(0003) (0006) (0105) (0135) (0 193)+ (0282)
Germany —0001 —0014 0540 -1137 -0311 —0980 0081 210 3445 4837 0605
(0-003) (0,006)’ (0299)’ (0,382)’ (0-395) (0,511) *-
Italy 0000 -0011 0012 —0067 0139 0568 0059 192 2731 4415 3990
(0003) (0006) +- (0033) (0056) (0100) (0181)
Japan 0001 —0012 0029 0255 0163 0434 0016 189 1443 1899 1093
(0,003) (0,006)4- (0-044) (0-200) (0,124) (0-292)
Netherlands —0.001 —0-013 0,047 —0,816 —0,280 —a536 0,107 2,06 4,324” 5.313” 2,098
(0.003) (0,006)’ (0,029) (0,243)’ (0,161)-f (0.343)
Switzerland 0.001 —0,018 0,433 --1,217 0.506 --- 1,191 0-088 2.03 3,588” 6025” 0-162
(0,004) (0007)’ (0,218)’ (0,356)’ (0,263) 4- (0,437)’
United Kingdom —0.0W —0,006 0-382 —0,950 0,319 - 1.087 0,097 1.79 3.979” 5,933” 1.052
(0-003) (0,006) (0149)’ (0-238)’ (0.180)+ (0-296)’
Standard errors of estimated coefficients appear in parentheses; asterisk indicates significance at 5 percent level and plus sign indicates
significance at 10 percent level.
201 Drand On equal 1,0 during period of US, monetary-target policy regime, October 1979—September 1982 and zero otherwise,
‘F-statistic for testing restriction that coefficients are stable across different monetary regimes; double asterisk indicates rejection at 1
percent level, asterisk indicates rejection at 5 percent level, and plus indicates rejection at 10 percent level.
‘F-statistic for testing the equality restriction on the coefficients of the change in the real and the inflation differentials (components of the
change in the nominal forward premium): asterisk indicates rejection at 5 percent level, plus indicates rejection at 10 percent level.
wi tin srich nets’s dl ti -ing the rest tif the fitiatinig matt
period ‘this is consmsttrnt with I”n-enkel’s 1981 at i-esu Its
for 1973—79. h-mails’, the tJur-hii—\-Vatsom) statistics in
tahhe 3 do ntt inthcate sen’iaI con’r-elatioin in the m’esid—
oafs, cninsisten t with th ntr mnai ntaimned hypothesis of
market efficiency,
‘there n-ernain tss’t n puzzling n-esoh ts: it I ‘t’he trs tf—
mated roefficiennts of the chanigtr in thitr inflation thfl’en-—
ential dun-ing the nntnnetars’ n-egimeant genei’ahls’ nega—
the, m-eftnting tine his’ptnthesis eoibodhed in) etltnatitinn 5:
thus nutrgatis-e coeftirient is significant at thtr ID pen-cent
ItrstrI On’ hiettei’ in) five t:ountn-ies. 121 \htmm-trtnyen-, the tie—
composition of the nominab intei-est diffei-ential is sig—
nifiramnt tinily fnni’ Canada anti Italy, This ir-n-ehevarire tih
lIne distinction betss’eenn n-eat and ntinnninai inter-es
thifi’t,n-t-.ntiais niIa\’ simply he a ctnnifin-nnatitin nfl’ i”anna’s
119841 assem-lionthat, ss’ith riskaversion on’svithout t’h’h’.
tine Fisher- et~rnationtines riot bnold iscc footnote 9t,
Irudettti, ton- six of’ the eight ctirn’enicies, the h—test does
ntnt i-eject the immnphrit n’estn’irtitir) tf equality tnf
changes inn the ntnminah interest thif’ei-i-,mtiaI’s two
components chsplaveti in table 3.
‘tine mnegativtr ctnefuicient tin) the inflation thf’fei’entiah
chiming the 1979—82 nionetai-s’ n-egimne is both pen’vasivtr
annd puzzi irig. ‘l’s-vti pt)ssitile cxiiianat itins are ss’o n-tin
considei-ing. h-inst. tine tine—ninontin hiom-iztnn tif’the esti—
ninatedi, anticipated CPI tnflatitmni rates useti in estimniat—
ing equatitnn 5’ may lie too short, om- tine estinnattrti
exptrt:tenl inilatitin sen’ies sinnnplv nnnav he had pn-tixies.
Serondi, tine man-kel nuna~’has’e dettrn’nninut,nh thai the.
t ,5. nnionietai-s’ nmtithom’its’ ~nnidb the adtnnnnistn-ationi ss’em-tr
ctimnmnnitted to loss’tnm’inng the U.S. intlationu n’ate, Ctnnnstt—FEDEiIAIftiES•EFiVEBAfii< c-F’S-f,
qtientlv, a siuon-t—tttm-rnu inn:rease in the t.I .8. expectedl
inflation n-atewould lead nnuan’kttt pan-ticmpannts to expttct
a tighteninug of nnnoiuetarv grtnwth.’ If so, a shtnn-t—tttn’m
men-ease inn 1.1,5,inflation wtiuidf head to tnnrn-eases inn the
Ii,S,n’ntal inttnm’est n-ateas the nuam-ket anticmpattndl tlntt
nnottetars’ authtiritv’s n’eaction, ‘this explanation, con—
sistennt witin rest-,an-t-,h hv Cornttlt 11982), has tuo t been
tested here. hut it is consistent with thtn deconnnposm—
t ion tuf chnannges in) the nntnminnal interttst diff’en’enntiah
genen-ath’nitit incn-ttasitug tiitt explanatory powttn’ cnf tine
equationu ftin’six of tine eight cm.rrl’enncies,”
We hnas’e testedi the efiiciennc of fom-wan-d exchange
man-kets for the dollar’ againust eight nnajoi- cn.nn’n’encies
dhiritig tine floating pen-itud. ‘line regr-ession estimates
clean-hydtennonstm-ate that faihinng tti acctiunnt for’dnanuges
in the policy pn’ocedtnn-esof the ti,S - minonnetam’v au thon-—
its’ enntails misspecificatmon . Monnetan’s’ r-eginnie ctnanges
ai tem’ the m’isk pm-ennia that nnan-ket pat-ticipants n’ethuir-e
on forwardh comntnarts andi affect tine din-ertion of en-n’ons
innphed iv ntinninal arid neal miews, that is, umnfon-eseetn
evttnnts orcun-n-ing between the timtt of ctinntm-ac t andn its
matui-ity, ‘lintt mmnphicatitins of the standai-d motlel of
exchange rate tiehiavitir- wertt suhistantmated ftnr morn—
nah niews urider- a montetan’s’ tar-get reginnntt, hut its
implication for imnfhatitin diff’ei-enntials was r’efuted.
VViniiea chosen’ niodehing tnf the titilitFs’ pn’oceniun’e was’
explain this n-ejection. it n-ennnains a pn-omninttnt puzzle
in thus studs’. Nonetbneless. tnnne inter-pn-ttat ion nif thttstn
results is that innan-ket participants n-egan-dtttl the US.
mnnnetarv ptihcv regime of 1979—82 as anuti—
inflationary. If this is comrect, it follows tinat cm-editile
goals of rnomnetarv policy may he as significant fom’
man-ken pan-ticipants as the mechannical dfetaihs of that
poticv’s executionn.
“The U.S. CPI inflation rate was 13,3 percent in 1979, 12.4 percent in
1980, 8.9 percent in 1981 and 3.9 percent in 1982. There is also
some support for this view in the impact of lagged reserve account-
ing during the monetary targeting period. As Kaufman (I 982) notes,
this results in more volatility ct both money and interest rates since a
decision to maintain a target growth path when the money supply
has exceeded the path requires a subsequent reduction of reserve
growth. Since banks already will have increased their required
reserves, real rates will vary with the money supply errors and,
perhaps, short-run inflation expectations.
“Cornet 11982) finds that unexpected monetary supply increases are
correlated wilh an appreciation in the dollar, not the depreciation
that an anticipated simple link with increased inflation would imply.
Corneli suggests that the explanation is an anticipated policy reac-
lion, a tightening of the money supply growth rate.
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